Politics Economy Country 2026-03-08T19:44:35+00:00

Israel's Nuclear Ambiguity Strategy

Former Argentine Deputy Nuclear Energy Secretary Julián Gadano explained Israel's policy of 'opaque proliferation' to maintain a military edge in the Middle East without formally admitting to having nuclear weapons. He also analyzed Iran's nuclear program.


Israel's Nuclear Ambiguity Strategy

Israel's strategic ambiguity over its nuclear capabilities is part of a deliberate policy that allows it to maintain a military advantage in the Middle East without formally admitting to possessing atomic weapons. This was explained by former Deputy Secretary of Nuclear Energy Julián Gadano, who analyzed the global map of nuclear powers, the deterrent role of these weapons, and Iran's technological progress toward the military threshold. According to the specialist in nuclear policy and management, Israeli policy falls within what specialized literature calls 'opaque proliferation,' a strategy where the country neither confirms nor publicly denies its nuclear arsenal. 'Of the nine countries that have nuclear weapons, five are authorized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty,' he detailed. He explained that this decision responded initially to the complex geopolitical situation in the Middle East during the Cold War and to international pressures to avoid a nuclear arms race in the region. The origin of this strategy dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. 'That's its political business,' Gadano pointed out. In contrast, other countries developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty. Among them are India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Gadano indicated that before the last conflict in the Middle East, the country was relatively close to achieving the enrichment level needed to manufacture a nuclear weapon. 'The military enrichment level is 90%.' These are the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom, the powers that make up the United Nations Security Council. According to Gadano, the attacks on nuclear facilities seriously damaged Iran's ability to continue this process. However, the country still retains significant nuclear material. 'What is left for Iran is a significant amount, about 500 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. It is not enough for the military grade, but it is technologically very close,' he warned. For the specialist, definitively stopping this advance depends not only on destroying facilities. It also involves neutralizing the technical knowledge that allows the nuclear program to be rebuilt. 'Destroying capabilities implies destroying physical facilities, but also delaying the other country in terms of knowledge,' he explained. In this context, he stated that in conflicts related to nuclear development, the target is also specialized human capital. 'This means capturing scientists, offering them asylum outside the country or also killing them,' he concluded. Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, these weapons have not been used in combat. 'Nuclear bombs are designed not to be used,' he explained. Iran had uranium enriched to 60%, something that cannot be justified for peaceful uses, he explained.